

EDGE

Segmentation & Security in a Tertiary Education Network

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EDGE – WHAT IS IT?

- The name of the most significant network and security project undertaken at the University of Tasmania:
 - A project that re-architected the University network
 - Introduced segmentation and security controls
 - Introduced significant security controls and concepts and features
 - Provided flexibility for University operations

THE RECOGNISED PROBLEMS

- Impact of de-centralised IT function
- Inconsistent processes
- Poor vulnerability management
- Vastly different approaches to risk acceptance
- Several security incidents
- Out of support equipment
- The rise of IoT
- Too much trust Too much traffic mixing



CHANGE IN THE WINDS

- In 2010 the University began changing the way it thought about IT risk
 - Brought about by a change in senior management
- Restructured parts of the University structure to centralise key functions, and allow greater consistency in Policy and risk management
- Moved from 'check box' audits to penetration testing
 - Highlighted issues with machine configuration, consistency, and trust in the network
 - Changes needed
- Made funding available in 2014 to address issues highlighted by audits
- Elevated project profile, increased authority to implement changes

BUT FIRST...SOME UTAS BACKGROUND

- Only University operating in Tasmania
 - Results in broad curriculum/subjects
 - Collaboration with State and Federal agencies
- Operates three major campuses in Tasmania
- Two teaching (Nursing) sites in NSW
- Many medium, small and specialist sites
 - Short term accommodation
 - Remote research locations
 - Remote health sites/clinics
- Network presence in over 60 locations
 - Everyone wants a similar/transparent experience



IT INFRASTRUCTURE BACKGROUND


- Two major data centres greater Hobart area,
 - One local, one Co-Lo
 - 11/26km diverse 80G dark L2 interconnect
- 60 WAN links, Mostly dark fibre or managed.
- 600+ Ethernet switches (mostly 24/48 1RU in stacks rather than chassis)
- 2500+ servers (Majority ESX hosting MS and RHEL)
- 10,000 managed end points, 5000 IT controlled
- 25,000 active wireless devices
 - 8,000 simultaneous

Newnham 768k IDSN Backup 155M Campus Cradle Coast 34M Mooreville Rd Radio Anne O'Byrne Centre IDSN Backup Menzies UTAS The Firewall Clinical School Internet Conservatorium 2M Art School Hunter St Sandy Bay Each with 64k PABX Room **IDSN Backup** 155M Ceduna (SA) Sandy Bay

UTAS CIRCA 2001

- No Wireless
- No VPN
- No SLB
- No Australian Maritime College
- Mostly low-bandwidth radio
- Just 8 teaching locations
- 1 Interstate site
- 1 firewall No DMZ

The simple times




2016

Things have changed


- Integration with AMC
- HPE MPLS network (2012)
- Large increase in sites
- Dual Internet connections
- Collaboration with Government agencies
- Radio Telescopes
- Wireless/VPN/Dorms
- Remote sites
- SLB/F5 ADC
- BUSINESS & USER EXPECTATIONS



WHERE IS UTAS?



MPLS REFRESHER



- VRF Virtual Routing and Forwarding Group of vlans
- Totally isolated, or traffic via flow via shared router or firewalls
- MPLS allows sharing of links whilst maintaining separation

UTAS MPLS core

- Deployed 2012
- HPE A5800 1RU L3 switches – "Goldilocks"
- Mostly 1/10G fibre interconnects

PROJECT OBJECTIVES (1)

- Vulnerability management
- Procedural and change management improvements
- Centralisation of front line staff
- Reduction in distributed servers
- Standard desktop and server images
- Improved audit processes



SIEM

Endpoint Protection

Data Protection

Change Control


Security
Information
&
Event
Management

Antivirus App Control Disk Encryption File Integrity Monitoring


PROJECT OBJECTIVES (2)

- Consistent SSL presentation utilising F5 as a ADC
- Network segmentation, separation of user and servers
- 2-Factor Authentication (2FA) for elevated access
- Firewall replacement (EoL) + VPN (EoL)
- Internet router replacement (EoL)

SSL INSPECTION AND OFFLOAD



SSL MANAGEMENT



Time to respond to Heartbleed was ~2 weeks

After F5 reconfiguration time to respond to Freak/Logjam was 10 minutes


Authentication






TIME TO DIVIDE

- Single organisation with single harden perimeter is no longer a suitable approach
- Adopt "Service Provider" mindset, not a single homogenous IT Department
- Diverse client base, with broad range of security requirements, risk profile and functional needs
- Segment and isolate to minimise risk, and reduce damage



SLICE'N'DICE

- Realisation that Users are untrusted and should be in the DMZ, not servers.
- In servers we trust, sort of.
- Increased segmentation inside DC.
- Grants visibility between application layers, multiple subnets/zones
- Traffic not controlled within subnet (yet). Future project (NSX?)



TRAFFIC CONTROL

- Discrete Management and Audit Zones, protected with 2FA
- Multiple "Semi-Trusted" user networks
- Trusted Data Centre Zone(s) including N-Tier traffic control

FIREWALL REPLACEMENT

- Functional requirements determined with professional services from external party
- Assisted in design of restructure of DMZ and Semi-Trust zones
- Vendor neutral tender for supply and implementation of new devices
- Internal PM resource assigned to assist with business interaction
- Successful tender by NTT was chosen
- Hardware was pairs of Palo Alto in HA split between DC
- PA-5050 pair for Internet connectivity PA-5060 pair for Data Centre control

NEXT GEN FIREWALLS

Tt 80

Port 443




Need to move on from simple IP and Port rules

Ports ≠ Applications
IP Addresses ≠ Users
Packets ≠ Content

DETERMINE LEGITIMATE TRAFFIC

What is the traffic and is it allowed? (App-ID) Allowed for this specific user or group?
(User ID)

What risks or threats are in the traffic? (Content ID)



Inbound Full cycle threat prevention

- Intrusion prevention
- Malware blocking
- Anti-virus control
- URL site blocking
- Encrypted and compressed files

Outbound Data leakage control


- Credit card numbers
- Custom data strings
- Document file types

DETECTING AND PREVENTING THREATS ACROSS THE UTAS NETWORK






At the internet edge



Between staff/students and devices within the LAN



At the data center edge, and between VM's



Within private, public and hybrid clouds



- 2 Factor Authentication is in deployment stage
- URL Policy is in final approval stage
- SSL Decryption awaiting signoff
- Rule migration still ongoing
- Always on VPN



Question Time