

Phishing with Office 365



*Minecraft, also a Microsoft product

Our users? →



Keep an eye out for a zombie villager, you might win something!

Like this guy, but not this one ->



Phishing with O365

- Environment Pre-migration – what we had
- Post-migration – what we lost
- Fun and games (well... not really) or bad timing?
- Review current processes
- Ransomware Mitigation strategies?
- Lessons learned – zombie proof your village



What we had...

- 2014 - On-prem Exchange 2010
 - Exchange servers just about all virtualised
- Mail filtering using Symantec Cloud (messagelabs)
 - Pretty good protection



What we lost...

- April 2015 – migration complete
- Symantec Cloud turned off
 - Spam and phishing increased
 - Mail flowing directly into O365 basic protection (ATP filters not released to Education yet and expensive)
- Limited mail-queue visibility!



Fun and games?

More staff getting phishing emails, like...



DRIVINGINFRINGEMENTINFO
PHOTOGRAPHIC WITNESS

You have been given using a drive violation:

Explanation: **inattentive car driving**
violation N: **714084022942**
Time frame involving issue: **07/04/2015**
Amount credited: **\$109.67 AUD**
Deadline: **07/05/2015**

To see more details you need to [check out your infringement notice](#).

[see your traffic infringement](#)

Settlement should be done in **14 day time** from the day associated with services on the intrusion info as well as the reminder information.

You could submit an application for an extendable to pay for the intrusion notice fee, or contest the particular liability, inside twenty eight days.

automatically created letter, you are free to [delist from mailinglist](#).





Private key will be destroyed on
17/04/2014
1:31 PM

Time left
71 : 37 : 49

Your personal files are encrypted!

Your important files **encryption** produced on this computer: photos, videos, documents, etc. [Here](#) is a complete list of encrypted files, and you can personally verify this.

Encryption was produced using a **unique** public key [RSA-2048](#) generated for this computer. To decrypt the files you need to obtain the **private key**.

The **single copy** of the private key, which will allow you to decrypt the files, located on a secret server on the Internet; the server will **destroy** the key after a time specified in this window. After that, **nobody and never will be able** to restore files...

To obtain the private key for this computer, which will automatically decrypt files, you need to pay **400 USD / 400 EUR** / similar amount in another currency.


Click «Next» to select the method of payment.

Any attempt to remove or damage this software will lead to the immediate destruction of the private key by server.


Next >>

Here be zombies!





How Ransomware works




The Angler exploit kit performs several steps to successfully infect systems:


- Victim accesses a compromised web server through a vulnerable browser.
- Compromised web server redirects to an intermediate server.
- Intermediate server redirects to a malicious web server hosting the exploit kit's landing page.
- Landing page checks for the presence of vulnerable plug-ins (e.g., Java®, Flash®, Silverlight®) and their version information.
- When a vulnerable browser or plug-in is found, the exploit kit delivers the proper payload and infects the machine.



Propagation of CryptoWall Version 3




CryptoWall Version 3 Phishing Campaigns



Really bad timing to turn off our filters during April!

Some links from the Auspost/AFP phishing scam had a very interesting URL

How deep is the rabbit hole...



Several things happening here:

URL link in email:

<http://xxxxxxx.xxx/system/logs/bfPYcul7XAGszzr.php?id=example@example.com>
(Redirect)

<http://post24-notice.net/ug22ectc.php?id=ZXhhbXBsZUBleGFtcGxLMNvbQ==>
(AusPost Page with Captcha Challenge)

<http://post24-notice.net/ug22ectc.php?id=ZXhhbXBsZUBleGFtcGxLMNvbQ==>
(POST captcha_code=26974, Redirect)

Malware download from yandex share:

https://downloader.disk.yandex.com/disk/32b75c3ce244c43768c9b145dfb2999382cff4c20c1d4e6436bc973f5d6f2c2c/55dfdd3b/h2wvLwF-bQZ1j6SxcVCNR3-dtkMMzVoL32Hfz5PiWv9UfSrJ9Eg2byl0A0GbbKEwDiKC7Ch0Z4q7naihNm3ZWA%3D%3D?uid=0&filename=notice_139691.zip&disposition=attachment&hash=bxVXwD%2BXezq9/mNrxNK%2BoVrgHqUuGuUhr/Vzer%2Bsmbg%3D&limit=0&content_type=application%2Fzip-compressed&fsiz=479629&hid=300b6c914d713e384b1d63950315e9d0&media_type=compressed&tknv=v2

File saved as notice_139691.zip





Index of /system/logs

- [Parent Directory](#)
- [0.php](#)
- [1.php](#)
- [5673667256e9d.php](#)
- [56bca78beac1f.php](#)
- [98yh87b564f.exe](#)
- [error.php](#)
- [ob.php](#)
- [r.php](#)
- [sys.php](#)
- [ws.php](#)
- [z3aj9lBgjnWJa.php](#)
- [zADm2n5qkDSO.php](#)
- [zRYJp.php](#)
- [zXy5FGsC9n.php](#)
- [zclTeYsCJA4pZc.php](#)
- [zsQw8V19Seq.php](#)

Apache/2.2.31 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.31 Open

Redirect php scripts and Malware for other campaigns

bestdeal4you.in

Malicious Content Blocked

Location: <http://www.bestdeal4you.in/system/logs/98yh87b564f.exe>

The requested location contains malicious content, identified as [Troj/Dridex-QW](#) and was blocked from downloading.

Return to the page you were previously viewing.

[Return to previous page](#)

sophos web prot



What web application uses /system/logs??? Lets go back a folder...

Index of /system/

Icon	Name	Last modified	Size	Description
Folder icon	Parent Directory	28-Aug-2015 09:42	-	
Folder icon	cache	31-May-2016 03:28	-	
Folder icon	config	09-Feb-2014 04:42	-	
Folder icon	database	07-Aug-2015 13:12	-	
Folder icon	dbase_data	09-Feb-2014 04:42	-	
Folder icon	engine	09-Feb-2014 04:42	-	
Folder icon	helper	27-Mar-2014 09:12	-	
Folder icon	library	09-Feb-2014 04:42	-	
Folder icon	logs	08-Nov-2015 13:57	-	
File icon	AmazonOrderAdjustmentTemplate.xls	09-Feb-2014 04:42	156k	
File icon	error_log	17-May-2016 08:34	24k	
File icon	startup.php	09-Feb-2014 04:42	4k	

Proudly Served by LiteSpeed Web Server at bankstakeinfor.com.au Port 443





[AmazonOrderAdjustmentTemplate.xls](#)

09-Feb-2014 04:42

156k

Huh? I can browse the file structure??
WOW...





Lots of sites with the
Same file....

... All shopping sites...

All world readable....

Some kind of
Shopping cart?

Lots of these
Hosting malware




Yup.... Opencart

Personal Open source Business Explore Pricing Blog Support This repository Search Sign in Sign up

opencart / opencart Watch 540 Star 2,597 Fork 2,367

Code Issues Pull requests Wiki Pulse Graphs

Branch: master opencart / upload / Create new file Find file History

 danielkerr more extension work Latest commit d45743c a day ago

admin	more extension work	a day ago
catalog	Merge pull request #4407 from opencart/master	5 days ago
image	I know a lot of the stuff im committing here is broken but i need to u...	6 months ago
install	menu sql	16 days ago
system	fix skipped compression response header	5 days ago
.htaccess.txt	#3248	10 months ago
config-dist.php	after the install process to force users to rename config-dist.php to...	4 years ago
index.php	added an events page	26 days ago
php.ini	#3131	11 months ago



Name	Date Modified	Size	Kind
startup.php	1 Aug 2013, 2:24 AM	3 KB	TextWr...ument
▶ logs	1 Aug 2013, 2:24 AM	--	Folder
▶ library	1 Aug 2013, 2:24 AM	--	Folder
▶ helper	1 Aug 2013, 2:24 AM	--	Folder
▶ engine	1 Aug 2013, 2:24 AM	--	Folder
▶ ebay_addon	1 Aug 2013, 2:24 AM	--	Folder
▶ database	1 Aug 2013, 2:24 AM	--	Folder
▶ config	1 Aug 2013, 2:24 AM	--	Folder
▶ cache	1 Aug 2013, 2:24 AM	--	Folder
AmazonOrderAdjustmentTemplate.xls	1 Aug 2013, 2:24 AM	159 KB	Micros...k (.xls)

Opencart v 1.5.6 1st Aug 2013!!

About the only version with this file

So we assume that this old version is
Vulnerable and being used to host malware



PHP Object Injection Vulnerability #1534

Closed

EgiX opened this issue on Jun 4, 2014 · 22 comments



EgiX commented on Jun 4, 2014

After a failed attempt to privately report this issue to "Daniel" (who doesn't believe the issue to be real) on the official community forum, I decided to open this ticket, hopefully it will be taken into account now. OpenCart is prone to a remote PHP object injection vulnerability: the vulnerable code is located within the "Cart::getProducts()" method (system/library/cart.php), which passes to the "unserialize()" function the key values of the array stored into the "data[cart]" session variable. Such values might be manipulated by an unauthenticated attacker via the "quantity" POST parameter during an "update" request. I've been able to find only one possible attack vector: by abusing the destructor method of the "DBMySQLi" class it might be possible to carry out Server-Side Request Forgery attacks (CWE-918). However, other attack vectors might be possible leveraging magic methods defined in third-party extensions (<http://www.opencart.com/index.php?route=extension/extension>).



danielkerr closed this on Jun 4, 2014

PHP Object Injection Vulnerability #1534

Closed

EgiX opened this issue on Jun 4, 2014 · 22 comments

**danielkerr** commented on Jun 4, 2014

interesting how you open this github account only yesterday! im pretty sure you were banned before.
when will you take the hint!!

after 3 times asking you to send me the vulnerability information you have now shown me that your are
wasting my time again!

the fact that all qty post parameters all have (int) next to them shows you have no clue nor should be
giving security advice!

might be possible leveraging magic methods defined in third-party extensions
(<http://www.opencart.com/index.php?route=extension/extension>).

**danielkerr** closed this on Jun 4, 2014

PHP Object Injection Vulnerability #1534

Closed

EgiX opened this issue on Jun 4, 2014 · 22 comments



EgiX commented on Jun 6, 2014

I'm gonna ignore all you said just because I realized it's a waste of time try to deal with a stupid like you! However, I can't ignore your last accusation, since before saying that something is vulnerable, I always try to test it by writing a PoC. Since you're continuing to believe this "vulnerability is bullshit", I have no other options, and I have to post the PoC used to confirm it:

```
<?php

error_reporting(E_ERROR);
set_time_limit(0);
ini_set('default_socket_timeout', 5);

function http_send($host, $packet)
{
    if (!($sock = fsockopen($host, 80))) die("\n[-] No response from {$host}:80\n");
    fputs($sock, $packet);
    return stream_get_contents($sock);
}
```

PHP Object Injection Vulnerability #1534

Closed

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**danielkerr** commented on Jun 6, 2014

so you are back to what if's! and 0 tests!

the above code would not work for another reason which is that the db class in opencart requires \$hostname, \$username, \$password, \$database fed into the constructor. even if you had this info the link would be overwritten on initiation.

"Furthermore, but I have not tested this, I think this vulnerability might exploited to map internal networks as well, like happened for the "WordPress Pingback Vulnerability"

Stop making wild guesses!

```
function http_send($host, $packet)
{
    if (!($sock = fsockopen($host, 80))) die("\n[-] No response from {$host}:80\n");
    fputs($sock, $packet);
    return stream_get_contents($sock);
}
```




scottstamp commented on Aug 5, 2014

"I wonder why I've never used OpenCart" ... "oh right it's lead developer is needed."


Nice find @EgiX, lol and thanks for the laugh :)

Anyway...

How do we block these sites?
And protect our Staff (or village)







We use Packetlogic

We can block URL's


It's not really designed for this

But it works!



Lets change some processes

- Block some URL's (http://*/system/logs/*)
- Block captcha image (users couldn't see it)
- Report websites to Netcraft, AusCERT
- Try to get websites taken down (AusCERT)
- Educate users
- Clean-up processes (several Cryptowall infections)



Ransomware Mitigation strategies?

- Considered restricting local Admin rights
- Use IDS alerts to detect users clicking on links
- Block executables running in Appdata/temp folders?
 - Application restrictions in GPO's
- Scanning fileshares for Cryptolocker files?
- Removed Domain admin rights from every-day login accounts (IT Staff)
 - provide alt login




Conclusions


- Office 365 protection not working
- At the time, MS ATP services just released
 - Not available to Education yet, will cost more
- Really need to stop phishing emails
- Produce graphs!
- Campaign for reinstatement of email filter (Symantec.Cloud)



CryptoWall Version 3 Phishing Campaigns






“Reported” phishing emails from Staff
there might have been a lot more!



Virus and phishing


March 2015



	Virus Attacks	51.12 %
	Phishing Attacks	48.88 %

Malware and phishing

March 2016



Malware Attacks	76.13 %
Phishing Attacks	23.87 %

Symantec.Cloud

- Symantec Cloud (messagelabs) license still valid until the end of the year
- Nov 2015 – turned filtering back on
- License renewed – CAUDIT pricing came out
- New features!



Symantec.Cloud

- eMail filtering – includes:
 - Malware
 - Anti-Spam
 - Data protection policies
- MSS – Managed Security Service
- Web filter – agent or proxy
- Customisable reports & Dashboard



Emails Scanned (7d)
270,701

Web Traffic Scanned (7d)
0.00 MB

IM Messages Scanned
N/A



1 day 7 days 31 days 1 year

Showing statistics for all domains [Change](#)

Email Anti Spam

[Less detail](#)

Identified as spam 1 day 7 days 31 days 1 year

Showing statistics for all domains [Change](#)



Email Anti Malware

[Less detail](#)

Volume of malware 1 day 7 days 31 days 1 year

Showing statistics for all domains [Change](#)



Lessons learned

- Filter your email! – mixed solutions?
- Educating users,
 - Anti-virus up-to-date
 - Phish your own Staff?
- Able to block URL's
 - Use AusCERT Malicious URL feed on Proxy servers or black hole DN, proactive protection



Lessons learned

- Using AusCERT's IRC chat (free for members) – community help!
- Consider the Dept. of Defence top strategies:
 1. Application whitelisting (yeah that's hard)
 2. Patch applications
 3. Patch OS
 4. Restrict admin privileges
 - As well as #5 - #35



Lessons learned

- Discontinue the use of Flash, keep Java up to date (or discontinue as well?)
- Thanks Netcraft for the USB stick!
 - (100+ phishing sites reported)
- Never dig directly up or down – or you're going to have a bad time!



Questions?

